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Scholarship in the field of international political economy (IPE) has increasingly 
devoted attention to how civilisational values have shaped historical understandings of 
international economic relations. Particularly prominent has been work highlighting the 
Eurocentric metanarratives embodied in the 19th and early 20th century Western political 
economy debates that created the foundations of the modern field of IPE (e.g. Hobson 
2013a, b; Blaney and Inayatullah 2010). Scholars such as John Hobson (2013b) have 
argued that only by recognising and transcending these intellectual foundations can a 
more truly ‘inter-civilisational’ IPE emerge in the current era. 
 
Within this growing body of scholarship, much less attention has been devoted to the 
question of how civilisational values informed thinking beyond the West about 
international economic relations during the 19th and early 20th centuries. One important 
exception, however, is Cristina Rojas’ (1995, 2002) analysis of Latin American debates 
about free trade in the mid-19th century. Focusing on the case of Colombia, she shows 
how creole elites embraced free trade ideas at this time as part of their wider 
commitment to import Western civilisational values. She also shows how these elites 
rejected any active role for the state in promoting local industry because the latter was 
dominated by artisans whose character they considered ‘uncivilised’ and whose 
products were not in keeping with the imported styles they preferred (Rojas, 2002, 
p.105). 
 
Building on the research agenda paved by Rojas’ work, this paper explores a second 
case in which civilisational values strongly influenced discussions about international 
economic relations in this period. The case involves Korean debates in the late 19th and 
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early 20th centuries about their country’s dramatic opening to the world economy at the 
time. These debates are rarely mentioned by IPE scholars, even by those interested in 
history of thought in political economy. But historians have generated a growing body 
of scholarship that highlights their rich and fascinating content. Drawing upon this 
literature and supplementing it with our own reading of primary texts, we highlight the 
prominence of the civilisational issues in these political economy debates. At the same 
time, we argue that the Korean discussions are particularly important because they 
displayed quite different dynamics than the ones Rojas analysed in the Colombian case.  
 
After a brief historical overview, the paper first explores the arguments of Korean 
advocates of their country’s economic opening. Like Colombian free traders, these 
thinkers backed this policy change on the grounds that it was part of a wider embrace of 
Western civilisational values. In contrast to the Colombian case, however, they also 
invoked those values in defence of a state-led developmental economic strategy that was 
designed to bolster their country’s wealth and power. In other words, while 
commitments to Western civilisational values undermined developmental policies in 
Colombia, they had the opposite effect in Korea. The case highlights the importance of 
recognising how dominant foreign ideas can be adapted – or ‘localised’ (Acharya, 2004, 
2009) - in peripheral contexts in very distinctive ways. 
 
The paper then turns to show how the Korean case was also distinctive in a second way: 
Western civilisational values were not the only foreign ones invoked in the debates 
about economic opening. Korean opponents of economic opening defended their 
country’s longstanding economic autarchy on the grounds that it upheld traditional Neo-
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Confucian values that had been imported from China. The Korean debate about 
economic opening was thus linked to a deeper clash between two distinct foreign 
civilisational values, each of which contributed to the construction of a completely 
different conception of political economy. Moreover, proponents of autarchy did not 
just invoke the Chinese civilisational standard but also ‘localised’ it, adapting its content 
to fit the Korean context at the time. The Korean case thus provides a fascinating 
example of how debates outside the West about international economic relations could 
be influenced by the diffusion and localisation of not just Western civilisational values 
but also non-Western ones. 
 
The paper concludes by summarising the significance of this analysis for three bodies of 
IPE scholarship. First, for scholars interested in the historical relationship between 
civilisational values and political economy, it shows how these values shaped 
understandings of international economic relations not just within the West but also in 
non-Western contexts during the 19th and early 20th centuries. While building on Rojas’ 
work in this way, the analysis also shows how the relationship between civilisational 
values and political economy displayed quite distinct dynamics in different non-
Western contexts. Second, the analysis also contributes to IPE literature examining the 
international diffusion of ideas. On one hand, it reinforces recent literature highlighting 
the importance of the agency of actors in ‘receiving’ countries in localising the ideas of 
dominant powers (Acharya, 2004, 2009, Ban, 2016). On the other, it encourages IPE 
scholars to devote more attention to how these localisation dynamics can involve both 
Western and non-Western ideas. Finally, the paper’s arguments are also significant for 
scholars seeking to build a more ‘inter-civilisational’ IPE today in two broader ways. In 
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an age of rising non-Western powers, this Korean history serves as an interesting 
precedent for the kinds of competing Western and non-Western ideational influences 
that may be experienced by many less powerful countries in the coming years. Our 
analysis also contributes to widening IPE scholars’ understanding of 19th and early 20th 
century political economy debates to be more inclusive of non-Western thinkers. 
 
From Hermit Kingdom to Economic Opening 
 
To understand the Korean debates of this time period, it is necessary first to describe the 
dramatic change in Korean foreign economic policy that took place in the late 19th 
century. Before the 1870s, Korean authorities had strongly resisted Western pressure to 
break open Korea’s traditionally closed economy, including initial efforts by the British 
in 1832 and 1845, and aggression by the French in 1866 and the United States in 1871. 
The Korean government resisted not just free trade but any kind of economic relations 
with Western powers. 
 
Korea’s foreign reputation as a ‘Hermit kingdom’ was not entirely deserved since Korea 
did engage in limited trade with Japan and China. But even that trade had been very 
strictly controlled since the 17th century. Under an agreement signed in 1609, Korea had 
insisted that Korean-Japanese trade be restricted to that between the Japanese domain of 
Tsushima and Pusan, and only under very specific conditions (Kim, 1980, p.30). In the 
case of China, some trade took place in the context of the regular envoys that the 
Korean government sent to the Chinese capital as part of its vassal state status. Since the 
founding of Joseon Dynasty (1392-1897), Korean leaders had embraced the idea that 
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the Chinese emperor was the son of heaven governing the world as a universal empire 
from China as the cultural centre of civilisation. In this Confucian-inspired ‘Chinese 
world order’, the Korean leader derived his legitimacy from the Chinese emperor’s 
blessing and he acknowledged this subordination through sending regular tribute to 
Beijing (Fairbank, 1968). In addition to providing tribute goods, Korean merchants and 
officials on these missions were allowed to trade privately during their brief stays in 
Beijing. The Korean government also allowed some strictly controlled trade at the 
Korean-Manchurian border (Kim, 1980, pp.7-11).  
 
The first step in the late 19th century Korean economic opening took place in 1876 
when, in context of Japanese military pressure, Korean authorities agreed that Pusan and 
two other ports could conduct unrestricted trade with Japan (unmediated by Tsushima) 
(Deuchler 1977). Chinese authorities had encouraged Korea to sign the 1876 treaty with 
Japan in order to avoid a Japanese-Korean war in which China would have had to 
become embroiled (Hwang, 1978, pp.63-4,68; Larsen, 2013, p.243). Responding to 
Korean political unrest in 1882, the Chinese government then strengthened its political 
influence over the country in much more interventionist ways than in the past, including 
a direct military presence, the placement of advisors in the government, and the creation 
and staffing of a new Korean Maritime Customs Service. Although Korea continued to 
send formal tribute missions to China until 1892, Chinese authorities seemed 
determined to transform the country into what Park (2013, p.295) calls a ‘Western-style 
protectorate’. 
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As part of its new Korean policy, China signed a trade deal that opened up the country 
in 1882 for the first time to Chinese merchants. In order to offset Japanese and Russian 
influence and avoid conflict with Western powers, Chinese authorities also encouraged 
Korea to sign trade treaties between 1882-84 with Western powers such as the US, the 
UK, Germany, Italy and Russia (Deuchler 1977). In addition to opening to trade in these 
ways, the Korean government also began at this time to welcome foreign capital, 
granting 23 concessions to foreigners (especially Japanese) between 1883-98 in sectors 
such as railways, telegraph, electricity, and resource extraction (Chandra, 1988, p.143). 
Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 then ended China’s control of 
Korea and ushered in a period of growing Japanese economic and political influence 
that culminated with formal colonisation in 1910.  
 
The dramatic opening of Korea to the world economy that began in the 1870s was 
clearly a process in which external pressure – particularly from Japan and China – 
played a central role. But domestic politics were also important. Korean supporters of 
economic opening existed already in advance of the country’s 1876 treaty with Japan 
and they became more influential after the early 1880s (Deuchler, 1977, pp.91-2; 
Hwang, 1978, pp. 70-1, 81; Choi, 2014, p.105; Huh, 2005). The most prominent 
supporters of economic opening in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were a group of 
gaehwa (‘enlightenment’) thinkers who also called for an end to Korea’s tributary 
relationship with China and the introduction of a Western-inspired domestic reform 
program to bring ‘civilisation and enlightenment’ to Korea.1  
                                               
1 For the English alphabet spellings of Korean words, we adopt the current official Romanisation system 
of the Korean alphabet (Hangeul) set by the Notification No. 2014-42 of the Ministry of Culture, Sports 
and Tourism of Republic of Korea on December 5, 2014. There are some exceptional cases, however, for 
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The Gaehwa Group 
 
Because of the link they drew between economic opening and civilisational values, the 
ideas of this gaehwa group are of particular interest to us. Before analysing these ideas, 
let us briefly describe who the leading figures in this group were. In advance of the 
1876 treaty with Japan, the most prominent proponent of economic opening and 
ambitious domestic reform was Bak Gyu-su (1807-77). His views emerged after he 
returned from an official tribute mission to China when he became convinced of the 
need for Korea to avoid China’s fate in the face of the new Western threat. In the early-
to-mid-1870s, he urged domestic reform and ‘opening the country voluntarily’ (quoted 
in Hwang, 1978, p.81).  
 
The gaehwa group is usually associated with the subsequent generation of reformers 
who followed in Bak Gyu-su’s footsteps. The most important of these was Yu Kil-chun 
(1856-1914). Yu first became interested in the West through his discussions with Bak 
Gyu-su in the mid-1870s. He then became the first Korean to study in Japan and the 
United States in the early 1880s (Choi, 2014). After returning to Korea, he was placed 
under house arrest between 1885-92 because of his association with reformers involved 
in an unsuccessful 1884 coup. In that time, he wrote a book (completed in 1889 but not 
published until 1895) titled Seoyu-gyeonmun (Observations on Travels in the West). 
                                               
which we follow their conventional English spellings in order to minimise confusion for readers. 
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Finch (2002, p.20) describes this as ‘undoubtedly the most influential Korean treatise on 
modernisation in the closing years of the Choson [Joseon] era’.  
 
Bak Gyu-su also directly influenced other prominent members of the gaehwa group 
such as Kim Ok-gyun (1851-94), Eo Yun-jung (1848-96), and Bak Yeong-hyo (1861-
1939) (Hwang, 1978, pp.81-2; Lew, 1977; Huh, 2005, pp.35-8; Cook, 1972, pp.29-31). 
Another significant gaehwa thinker was Soh Jaipil (1864-1951), who – along with Yu 
Kil-chun, Eo Yun-jung and Bak Yeong-hyo – played an active role in the 1894-5 reform 
government, and then popularised gaehwa ideas through his creation in 1896 of Korea’s 
first modern private newspaper, The Independent (Dokrip-Sinmun). One of Soh’s 
students, Rhee Syngman (1875-1965) also deserves special mention for his 1904 book 
(published in 1910) titled The Spirit of Independence, a work that Lew (2001, p.xii) 
describes as ‘the best’ of the gaehwa literature of late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Completing that book while imprisoned for subversive activities, Rhee went on to earn 
a PhD in politics from Princeton and later became the first president of South Korea in 
1948. 
 
The Western civilisational standard 
 
These figures – and others associated with gaehwa thought – did not agree on 
everything, but they shared a commitment to bring ‘civilisation and enlightenment’ to 
Korea (Schmid 2002). By this, they meant adopting ideas and practices that brought the 
Korean nation and its people up to standards reached in the wealthier and more 
powerful countries of the West. While Korean intellectuals had traditionally looked to 
 9
Chinese civilisation for inspiration and models, these thinkers criticised China’s poverty 
and weakness in comparison to the countries of the West and called for a reorientation 
of Korean worldviews towards the latter. 
 
The gaehwa group’s appeal to Western civilisational standards shared some similarities 
to that of the Colombian elites at this time analysed by Rojas (1995, 2002). There was, 
however, an important difference. The desire of elites in Colombia (and elsewhere in 
Latin America) to follow Western civilisational ideals had a long history, dating back to 
the Spanish colonial period, and it was associated with the preservation of their 
domestic social position. In the mid-19th century period, Rojas argues that the 
civilisational aspirations of male Colombian creole elites was linked specifically to the 
consolidation of their control at the time over domestic groups such as mestizos, blacks, 
women, and Indians. By contrast, the embrace of Western civilisational standards by the 
Korean gaehwa group was very new and it reflected their desire to fend off the new 
external threats facing their country. 
 
Because these threats emanated from wealthier and more powerful states, their core goal 
was to undertake reforms that would boost the wealth and power of Korea. The 
reciprocal relationship between national wealth and power was stressed by gaehwa 
thinkers. For example, an essay in the newspaper Hanseong-Sunbo, which gaehwa 
thinkers used to ‘enlighten’ people (Kim, 1989a, p.121), preached the following: ‘There 
is no powerful nation that is not wealthy, and there is no wealthy nation that is not 
powerful. For a nation to be powerful, it should become wealthy first’ (Hanseong-
Sunbo, 1884a). Similarly, another Hanseong-Sunbo (1884b) essay comparing the 
 10
mighty West and feeble China argued: ‘Wealth comes from power, and Power makes 
wealth. Wealth and Power are the causes for each other’. 
 
From the gaehwa perspective, the best way to pursue ‘wealth and power’ was to 
emulate Western states that were the wealthiest and most powerful in the world. 
Embracing a Western civilisational standard, in other words, meant adopting the ideas 
and practices of those states that helped to cultivate national wealth and power. Schmid 
(2002) notes that Korean reformers did not see Western civilisational values as 
permanently superior. Although Western countries were seen to be at the forefront of 
human advancement, reformers argued that other societies – including Eastern ones – 
had contributed in the past to global civilisational progress and they could do so again if 
they caught up to the West. Underlying this worldview was a stage theory of human 
progress that differed from traditional Confucian cyclical views of history (Chung, 
2006; Kim, 2012). In the minds of Korean reformers such as Yu Kil-chun, their country 
had reached a ‘semi-enlightened’ stage, one step above ‘unenlightened’ but below the 
‘enlightened’ status of the West to which they aspired (quoted in Choi, 2014, p.111). If 
their country was successfully reformed, it could reach the higher stage. 
 
The imperative to undertake these reforms was the need for survival in a new Western-
dominated global context characterised by intense inter-state competition (Lee, 2000, 
pp.42-3; Rhee (1910[2001], p.254). For gaehwa thinkers such as Yu Kil-chun, this 
world of intense inter-state competition was not just threatening to Korea’s existence. 
Drawing on Western social Darwinist thought that he picked up from thinkers in Japan 
and the US, he argued that it was also a positive force for human progress because it 
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encouraged countries to reform in order to survive (Tikhonov, 2010. ch.2; Choi, 2014, 
p.109). As he put it in a paper titled ‘On Competition’ written in 1883, ‘If states did not 
compete with each other, how could they increase their strength, wealth, and prestige?’ 
(quoted in Tikhonov, 2010, p.25).  
 
This social Darwinist logic had become a dominant ideology and justification for 
reforms in Korea by the early 1900s (Tikhonov, 2010). It encouraged Korean interest in 
countries such as Egypt and Vietnam which had become colonised, a fate that Korean 
reformers blamed on those countries’ failure to reform sufficiently (Tikhonov, 2010, 
p.204). From the standpoint of gaehwa thinkers, Korea needed to avoid a similar 
destiny by cultivating a stronger sense of national purpose and identity to respond 
effectively to the world of inter-state competition. As Soh Jaipil put it in The 
Independent in 1896: ‘What makes Korea so weak as a nation is that the people are not 
united in their sentiments…they do not appreciate the common fate in which they are 
bound together’ (quoted in McNamara, 1996, p.80; see also Schmid, 2002; Chandra, 
1988, ch.6). 
 
The gaehwa group’s appeal to Western civilisational values was thus associated with a 
strongly developmental pursuit of national wealth and power. This situation contrasted 
sharply with the Colombian context where the creole elite’s ‘will to civilisation’ was 
associated with very different goals that defended elite privilege and undermined 
national developmental initiatives. The ways in which Western civilisational values 
could be infused with such different meanings in the process of their diffusion to non-
Western contexts highlights the importance of what Amitav Acharya (2004, 2009) has 
 12
called ‘localisation’. Acharya uses this term to refer to the way that local agents 
translate and adapt ideas diffusing from dominant powers in ways that fit their local 
circumstances and intellectual traditions (see also Ban, 2016).  
 
In the Korean case, gaehwa thinkers ‘localised’ Western civilisational values in the 
context of the severe external challenges their country faced. Local intellectual 
traditions also shaped the gaehwa group’s interpretation of the meaning and 
significance of Western civilisation values. For example, in their efforts to understand 
the new threatening international environment they faced, Korean reformers – like their 
Japanese and Chinese counterparts – drew on a much older ‘legalist’ tradition in 
Chinese thought that prioritised the pursuit of state ‘wealth and power’ during the 
period of the Warring States (403-221 BC). To Koreans steeped in classical Chinese 
learning, this history provided an important reference point for interpreting the new 
Western civilisational norms. Here, for example, is how the Korean monarch discussed 
with his officials the new threatening international environment his country was facing 
in 1881: ‘Is it the same as in the Warring States period in ancient China, when only 
enrichment and strengthening were sought after?’ Eo Yun-jung replied: ‘That is really 
the case’ (quoted in Huh, 2005, p.38). In a long 1888 ‘Memorial on Enlightenment’ 
addressed to the monarch, Bak Yeong-hyo also invoked the analogy, arguing that ‘The 
world today resembles the Warring States Period of China’ (quoted in Lee, 2000, pp.42-
3).  
 
The gaehwa thinkers’ interpretation of Western civilisational values was also filtered 
through the East Asia intellectual environment of the time. For example, Korean 
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reformist thinking about the sources of Western power and wealth was initially heavily 
influenced by an earlier prominent analysis of the West by the Chinese scholar Wei 
Yuan (Choi, 2014, p.105; Hwang, 1978, p.81; Lee, 2000, p.36fn1; Tikhonov,2010, 
p.24). Written in the wake of the first Opium War, Wei Yuan’s 1844 work – which was 
also influential in Japan – had argued the West’s strength was grounded not just in 
superior military technology but also in the West’s focus on commerce backed by state 
power (Leonard, 1984).  
 
The ideas and actions of Japanese reformers also influenced gaehwa thought. For 
example, Fukuzawa Yukichi, the famous Japanese reformist thinker, developed a close 
relationship with figures such as Yu Kil-chun and Kim Ok-gyun in the early 1880s 
when they travelled to Japan. Many gaehwa ideas drew directly on his thinking, 
including the broad ‘civilisation and enlightenment’ framing of gaehwa thought. Some 
content and even vocabulary in Yu’s famous 1895 book was also modelled on 
Fukuzawa’s 1869 analysis of the West (Seiyo Jijo) (Choi, 2014; Huh, 2005; Lew, 2001, 
p.43; Schmid, 2002, pp.110-1). After 1868, the actions of the Japanese Meiji leaders – 
whose slogan ‘rich nation, strong army’ drew inspiration from ancient Chinese legalist 
thought  (Samuels 1984, pp.35-6) – also served as an example to Korean gaehwa 
reformers (Lew, 2001; Tikhonov, 2010, p.66; Rhee 1910[2001], p.148). 
 
The case for economic opening 
 
If the goal of reaching Western civilisational standards involved the pursuit of national 
power and wealth, how did this objective translate into gaehwa group’s support for 
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Korean economic opening? In the Colombian case, one way that elite commitment to 
Western civilisational values translated into support for free trade was that it encouraged 
respect for the authority of Western economic liberal thought. In a more practical sense, 
free trade policies also enabled elites to import European clothing and other luxury 
products that distinguished their class (Rojas, 2002, 111-6). These links between 
Western civilisational values and support for free trade were present in other Latin 
American countries at this time as well. For example, Gootenberg (1989, p.131) 
describes how Peruvian liberals in the early 1850s invoked not just the authority of 
foreign free trade theory but also a ‘”rights” to luxury’ argument in their successful 
campaign to introduce free trade policies. 
 
Korean gaehwa thinkers did not echo these Latin American concerns about importing 
luxury goods, but they were certainly influenced by the authority of the ideas of 
Western economic liberalism and invoked them in support of the economic opening of 
their country. For example, Rhee (1910[2001], p.254) called attention to how commerce 
– both domestic and international – encouraged a beneficial division of labour. He and 
others also sometimes followed Western liberals in highlighting the cosmopolitan 
benefits that would stem from economic openness. For Rhee, Korea’s ‘unused’ 
resources needed to be made available to people in foreign countries ‘who face death 
due to the absence of resources’. As he put it. ‘How can we be so selfish as to ignore the 
suffering of others and refuse contacts with the rest of the world?’ (Rhee, 1910[2001], 
p.65). Yu Kil-chun also argued that trade would boost international goodwill (quoted in 
McNamara, 1996, p.82). 
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But the main focus of gaehwa thinkers was on the benefits of economic openness for 
Korea rather than the world. These economic benefits were cast as boosting not just 
Korea’s wealth in the ways that economic liberals described but also its power. This 
‘wealth and power’ framing highlights how the link between Western civilisational 
values and support for economic opening worked not just through authority of Western 
economic liberalism. Gaehwa thinkers also backed economic opening because they 
believed this policy reform would facilitate the pursuit of national power and wealth 
that they deemed necessary to meet Western civilisational standards.  
 
In what ways did they think economic openness would bolster Korea’s power and 
wealth? To begin with, it would create new markets for Korean goods and enable 
imports of useful manufactured products, advanced foreign technology, and foreign 
knowledge (Lee, 2000, pp.53-4; McNamara, 1996, pp.51, 83; Rhee, 1910[2001], pp.54-
8, 64-6; Chung, 2008). Yu Kil-chun also argued that openness would foster ‘the 
aggressive spirit of competition’ that Korea needed to survive, in contrast to the 
stagnation that he associated with autarchy (Lee, 2000, pp.52-3). As he put it in 1883: 
‘Look at European countries and America. Haven’t they thrived with greater wealth and 
power because they have expanded traffic and interaction with even far-off countries, in 
addition to having closely associated among themselves for hundreds of years?’ (quoted 
in Lee, 2000, pp.52-3).  
 
The link between economic opening and state-building goals was also apparent in some 
other arguments advanced by gaehwa thinkers. For example, McNamara (1996, p.51) 
notes how advocates of international trade argued that ‘[o]pening ports to foreign trade 
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would enrich the national treasury’. In an era when the Korean state’s capacity to raise 
revenue from other sources was limited, tariff revenue from expanding trade was very 
important. By 1905, its size had grown to be over ten times that in 1886 and to a value 
that was over twenty percent of the total spending of the Korean government at the time 
(McNamara, 1996, p.28). Gaehwa thinkers also noted that the protection of Korean 
sovereignty would benefit from the fact that trade between Korean and foreign powers 
required the establishment of diplomatic ties between them (Chung, 2008, pp.34-5; 
Kim, 1989b, p.227).  
 
Their concern for ‘wealth and power’ led gaehwa thinkers to call for a more active role 
for the state in promoting Korea’s economic interests than many Western economic 
liberals would have endorsed. For example, government promotion of domestic 
manufacturing was seen as important because industrialisation made an important 
contribution to national power and rising incomes (Yu, 1895[2004], pp.385-6; Shin, 
2000, p.90; Rhee 1910[2001], p.261). Gaehwa thinkers also expressed concerns about 
the growing role of foreign (especially Japanese) merchants and bankers within Korea 
who appeared to be reaping the bulk of the gains from trade and finance, and threatened 
Korea’s sovereignty (Chandra, 1988, pp.141-2; Tikhonov, 2010, pp.73-7; Rhee 
(1910[2001], pp.236-7). To address these problems, some gaehwa thinkers suggested 
limits on the business activities of foreigners in Korea as well as the use of tariffs (Shin, 
2000, p.98; Rhee 1910[2001], p.246; Tikhonov, 2010, pp.70-1, 145).  
 
To encourage Korea’s industry and commerce, gaehwa thinkers urged the establishment 
of modern firms, and suggested that the government should subsidise them when they 
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suffered losses. As a means of providing necessary capital for industrialisation, they 
called for the creation of a central bank and commercial banks. Gaehwa thinkers also 
suggested centralising the state’s fiscal management in order to strengthen its capacity 
to support the growth of modern corporations and industrialisation. In addition, they 
emphasised the need to encourage the use of Western technology through imports of 
foreign machines, invitations of foreign technocrats to Korea, the sending of students to 
study abroad, the creation of research institutions, the building of modern schools, and 
the publication of books on science and technology (Shin, 2000, pp.95-8, 101-2, 247-8). 
Gaehwa thinkers also suggested that the government should provide information to 
local businesses about their foreign trading partners and commercial technologies (Yu, 
1895[2004], p.384; Rhee 1910[2001], p.256). In addition, Kim Ok-gyun pointed to the 
example of how other countries used military power to defend commercial interests 
abroad: ‘Trade is done with all countries under the shield of military force’ (quoted in 
Lee, 2000, p.59; see also Rhee 1910[2001], p.255). 
 
Alongside their advocacy of the growth of industry and commerce, gaehwa thinkers 
emphasised the need for the development of sectors such as mining, fisheries, and 
agriculture. They argued that these sectors could provide key raw materials to the 
manufacturing sector as well as boost exports, particularly to Japan whose 
manufacturing sector needed Korean resources (Shin, 2000, p.93; Tikhonov, 2010, pp. 
67-8). If private capital was not sufficient for building necessary infrastructure for 
agricultural reform such as dams, they advocated government subsidisation of such 
projects (Kim, 1989b, p.183).  The gaehwa group also urged the state to build modern 
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transportation and communications infrastructure, including the development of roads, 
railways, steamboats, postal service and telegraph (e.g. Rhee, 1910[2001], p.255). 
 
Gaehwa thinkers thus envisioned the state assuming an activist role in their program of 
boosting Korea’s wealth and power. This role should not be overstated, however. They 
were also deeply committed to the idea that energy and resources of Koreans needed to 
be mobilised by augmenting their individual freedom. In addition to political freedom, 
they emphasised economic freedom, celebrating free enterprise, private property, and 
entrepreneurship. In their mind, these liberal values were not incompatible with 
developmental goals: they hoped to unleash individuals’ pursuit of wealth domestically 
in order to strengthen the nation’s overall wealth and power (Lew, 2001, 38-40; Yu 
1895[2004], pp.144, 154-60; Tikhonov, 2010, 28). 
 
The gaehwa group’s focus on ‘wealth and power’ and an activist developmental state in 
the context of economic opening raises the question of whether these thinkers were 
drawing on Western mercantilist or economic nationalist thought. We have seen little 
evidence that they explicitly invoked those Western traditions of thought.2 As some of 
the quotes above made clear, however, they certainly did invoke their observations of 
the practices of Western states. We have also noted earlier how gaehwa thinkers clearly 
were inspired by the older Chinese legalist tradition as well as 19th century Chinese and 
                                               
2 List’s thought was not introduced to the country until after 1900 (Lee 1985, 1987; Lee 2015). Since 
many gaehwa thinkers travelled and studied abroad in Japan and the West, it is possible that they picked 
up his ideas there. We have not, however, found any direct references to his work in their writings. Given 
that there was less of a convention to cite sources in that era, this lack of attribution does not necessarily 
imply a complete lack of influence. Those who were impressed by the ‘authority’ of Western economic 
liberalism may also have had strategic reasons to downplay any influence of List’s ideas. 
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Japanese thinkers such as Wei Yuan and Fukuzawa Yukichi. In addition, they drew 
inspiration from the example of Meiji Japan’s activist catch-up policies (Shin, 2000, 
p.105). 
 
In addition to these external influences, gaehwa thinkers drew on the Korean 
intellectual tradition of Silhak (‘practical learning’) reformist thought that had first 
emerged in the 17th century and flourished in Korea during the second half of the 18th 
century (Kalton, 1975). Some Silhak thinkers – such as Bak Ji-won (1737-1805) and 
Bak Je-ga (1750-1805) – had emphasised the need for the promotion of industry and 
commerce, including foreign commerce (Choe, 1972; Lee, 2011). Bak Je-ga 
(1778[2013], pp. 252, 258, 275, 278) put special emphasis on the need for international 
trade, arguing that would help to ‘overcome poverty’ and boost Korea’s ‘wealth and 
strength’ by increasing the supply of goods in the country, encouraging consumption, 
and promoting learning from foreigners. This Silhak thought had a direct impact on a 
number of the later promoters of economic opening. For example, Bak Gyu-su was 
educated by the prominent Silhak thinker Jeong Yak-yong and his ideas were also 
shaped by Bak Ji-won who was his grandfather (Hwang, 1978, p.81; Choi, 2014). 
Important gaehwa thinkers such as Yu Kil-chun, Kim Ok-gyun, and Bak Yeong-hyo 
were also very interested in Silhak thought and saw themselves as building on this 
tradition (Hwang, 1978, p.81; Lew, 2001, p.43; Tikhonov, 2010, p.24; Cook, 1972, 
p.222).  
 
The Wijeong-cheoksa Group 
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Gaehwa thinkers thus invoked Western civilisational values in a very different way than 
Colombia elites did: to support a developmental economic strategy designed to boost 
national power and wealth. There was another very important difference between the 
two country contexts. In the Colombian case, civilisational values were invoked in 
political economy debates mostly just by supporters of free trade. When opponents of 
free trade discussed civilisational issues, it was usually just to try to poke holes in the 
logic of elite argumentation on this issue. For example, when lamenting how free trade 
undermined local manufacturing, the prominent Colombian artisan José Leocadio 
Camacho asked: ‘How is an advancement of civilisation possible in a country where 
manual occupations are dishonoured?’ (quoted on Rojas, 2002, p.110). Artisans in other 
Latin American countries, such as Bolivia, also mocked the equation of free trade with 
civilisation, arguing ‘[w]e must become civilised...and starve’ (quoted in Thiessen-
Reilly 2002, p.231).  
 
In Korea, the situation was different. Civilisational issues were at the core of both sides 
of the debate about economic opening in Korea. Moreover, it was not just one set of 
foreign civilisational values that were invoked in this heated disagreement about the 
country’s foreign economic policy. While gaehwa thinkers appealed to Western 
standards, their opponents prioritised an entirely different set of foreign civilisational 
values: the country’s longstanding commitment to Chinese-originated Neo-Confucian 
values. 
 
Established by the Chinese scholar Zhu Xi (1130 to 1200), Neo-Confucianism had been 
imported to Korea and became the dominant ideology in the country with the founding 
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of the Joseon Dynasty (Chung, 1995, ch.1). Like other Confucian thinkers, Zhu Xi 
placed the highest priority on ethics and morality, which were seen to develop self-
discipline. He was particularly critical of worldly desires such as economic motives 
because they corrupted the human nature bestowed on humans from natural principle. 
He felt that people had to eliminate selfish desires by disciplining themselves in order to 
preserve their human nature. In Joseon Dynasty Korea, profit-seeking activity was 
accordingly regarded as unrespectable and sometimes even immoral, and strict 
constraints were placed on commerce and the development of markets. The Joseon 
Dynasty also rigidly implemented the Confucian four-class social system, with the 
(Confucian) scholar-gentry class located at the top, followed by the farmers, the artisans 
and lastly the merchants. The defence of this social order provided another reason to 
suppress commerce and industry (Chung, 2008, pp.26-7).  
 
Korean opponents of the gaehwa thinkers argued that economic autarchy was necessary 
in order to protect these Neo-Confucian values. These supporters of Korean economic 
autarchy were known as the wijeong-cheoksa group. The term wijeong-cheoksa literally 
means to preserve the right (or orthodox) thought (wijeong) and to dispel heresy 
(cheoksa). They considered the ‘right thought’ to be Neo-Confucianism, while all other 
ideas, including any Western ones, were seen as heresy. While the gaehwa thinkers 
looked to the West for inspiration and models to be emulated, these Korean thinkers 
disdained the West as ‘barbarians’ or ‘beasts’. Similarly, while the gaehwa group urged 
an abandonment of Sino-centric thinking and criticised China’s relative poverty and 
weakness, the wijeong-cheoksa group saw Chinese Neo-Confucian ethics and morals as 
the true universal standard of ‘civilisation’. 
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This school was dominant intellectually in Korea before the 1870s and its members 
were the lead opponents of the 1876 Korea-Japan treaty. While debates about the initial 
1876 agreement with Japan were ‘confined to the capital and the highest government 
officials’ (Deuchler, 1977, p.226), the disagreements between the gaehwa and wijeong-
cheoksa groups became the subject of increasingly prominent public and national 
discussion from the 1880s onwards. The wijeong-cheoksa group objected to the further 
opening of the early 1880s, the modernizing Gabo reforms of 1894-5, and, more 
generally, Korea’s growing integration in the world economy in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries. 
 
The group was led intellectually by conservative Confucian literati who favoured the 
maintenance of the traditional social structure and economic autarchic policies of the 
past. An early prominent figure was Lee Hang-ro (1792-1868) who played a role in 
strengthening the government’s determination to fend off the Western initiatives to open 
the country before the 1870s (Chung, 1995). After Lee’s death, his student Choi Ik-
hyun (1833-1906) emerged as one of the leading intellectuals opposing economic 
openness, initially as a government official but later as a member of resistance 
movements outside the government (he eventually died in prison).  
 
Chinese civilisational values and economic autarchy 
 
Why did the wijeong-cheoksa group see economic opening as threatening to Neo-
Confucian values? Thinkers such as Lee Hang-ro worried that economic opening would 
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destroy the traditional domestic culture and social structure based on Neo-Confucian 
values that they sought to preserve (and from which they, as Confucian literati, 
benefitted directly) (Chung, 1995; Chang, 2003, pp.35-50). It would do this partly by 
encouraging the very commerce and profit-seeking behaviour that Neo-Confucianism 
opposed. Lee also worried that Confucian values of modesty and frugality would be 
undermined by an inflow of Western consumer goods that might be materially attractive 
to Koreans (Chung, 1995, p.78).  
 
More generally, Lee argued that economic opening would enable the inflow of Western 
ideas and culture that risked contaminating the minds of the people. He contrasted the 
motivation of ‘material force’ in the West with its focus on profit-seeking and the 
satisfaction of human desires with the ‘principle’ of the Confucian moral way. While 
gaehwa thinkers argued that economic opening would enable useful learning from 
foreigners, he argued that Western Learning ‘ruins ethics and destroys proprieties’. 
Indeed, he warned more generally that Korean society needed to be protected against 
the ‘flood’ of ‘human desires’ that might be aroused by the inflow of Western culture 
(quotes in Chung, 1995, pp.131, 128, 126). The result would be apocalyptic: ‘If the 
Way of China were to be ruined, we would be reduced to barbarians and beasts’ (quoted 
on Chung 1995, p.127). His warning phrase ‘exchange of commodities, exchange of 
immorality’ (tonghwa tongsaek) became a dominant theme of opponents of trade by the 
end of the century (quoted in McNamara, 1996, p.62).  
 
Alongside these arguments, wijeong-cheoksa thinkers also questioned the alleged 
material benefits of economic opening. Some questioned the usefulness of products that 
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foreigners had to offer. In the words of the Korean monarch in 1871, ‘[c]ommodities 
brought to our shores by the foreign ships, tough, ingenious and clever in the extreme, 
are not necessities from the viewpoint of utility for daily existence’ (quoted in Lin, 
1935, p.205). When opposing the 1876 treaty with Japan, Choi Ik-hyun also warned that 
Korea would be hurt economically by an outflow of Korean rice whose supply was 
limited (Hwang, 1978, p.68). Lee worried more generally that Korea would be 
exporting resources whose supply was limited, while importing foreign manufacturers 
which could be produced ‘without restriction’. He argued that this kind of trading 
relationship would damage Korea: ‘If we were to exchange that which is scarce for that 
which is in surplus how could we not be in difficulty?’ (quoted in Chung, 1995, p.208).  
 
Aware of Korea’s economic backwardness, Lee also worried that imports from abroad 
would undermine local Korean producers. The impact would be felt not just by those 
whose livelihoods were directly threatened but also by the entire self-sufficient agrarian 
economic structure and its associated rural culture, both of which he associated with 
broader Confucian values (Chung, 1995, pp.38, 210-11). These concerns remained 
salient among critics of economic opening in the late 19th and early 20th centuries when 
Confucian wijeong-cheoksa literati increasingly joined forces with rural farmers 
reacting against the growing penetration of commercial forces into rural society and 
their new vulnerability to foreign merchants and the vagaries of the international grain 
trade. Wijeong-cheoksa thinkers also expressed growing concern about Korea becoming 
a victim of foreign exploitation as foreign investors increasingly acquired Korean 
property and resources (McNamara, 1996, ch.3). 
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These arguments did not prevent some wijeong-cheoksa thinkers such as Lee from 
acknowledging the superiority of Western technology and goods. From their standpoint, 
however, the standard of civilisation was not technological and material progress but 
rather the realisation of ethics and morals based upon benevolence and righteousness, as 
exemplified by ‘ancient China’ (Kim, 2012). In the face of the new Western threat, they 
urged not just a ban on external trade but also re-commitment from the people to the 
Neo-Confucian principles that could sustain a moralist state and social order (Chung, 
1995, p.209). For thinkers such as Lee, the latter was just as important as the former, if 
not more so. As Chung puts it, Lee’s ‘Confucian conceptions of society, political order, 
and social control were dependent upon the people’s state of mind…. External defence 
of the state and society was contingent upon internal reform – the internal cultivation of 
the self’ (Chung, 1995, p.209). Indeed, in an 1866 memorial to the King, he even 
suggested that the monarch set an example to the people of his ‘mastery of self and 
rectification of mind’ by burning Western goods in the palace court (Quoted in Chung 
1995, p.206). 
 
The commitment of wijeong-cheoksa thinkers to Neo-Confucianism at the time was 
only strengthened by their view that Korea remained the only civilised nation 
preserving the revered high culture and moral values. After the collapse of the Ming 
dynasty in the 17th century, Korean Neo-Confucians had viewed with great dismay how 
the Qing Dynasty was established by the Jurchen clan from Manchuria, a group that 
they viewed as barbarians. When the Qing empire opened to trade with the Western 
‘barbarians’ after the Opium Wars, their disdain for China’s rulers was only reinforced 
(Chung, 1995, pp.7-8; Kim, 1980, pp.26-9, 66-7). Korean Neo-Confucians were equally 
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critical of the economic opening and embrace of the West by Japan, a country whose 
people they already had felt were inferior to Koreans (Hwang, 1978, p.68; Deuchler, 
1977, p.31). For example, when arguing against the 1876 treaty with Japan, Choi Ik-
hyun suggested that the Japanese had become ‘Westernized barbarians’ (quoted on 
Hwang, 1978, p.68). 
 
In this context, wijeong-cheoksa thinkers held strongly to a Sojunghwa (little China) 
doctrine which depicted Korea as the only country still upholding the civilised 
Confucian values of old Chinese empire (Chung, 1995, pp.81-2, 131, 135; McNamara, 
1996, p.55). As Kim (1980, p.65) puts it, ‘Most Korean scholar-officials and literati 
belied that, with China and Japan already “contaminated” by the “evil” influence of the 
Western barbarians, it was essential for Korea to remain free of that influence and 
uphold Eastern (Chinese) tradition if civilisation was to be saved’. (Kim 1980, pp.63-4). 
As one Confucian opponent of the 1876 treaty with Japan argued, ‘present-day Japan is 
a Westernised bandit; therefore, if we accept her by opening our ports, we will all 
become like beasts. The Western bandits are the most pernicious of all the barbarians 
[we have ever faced in history]; they are like poisoned arrows. We must therefore reject 
them and all things Western’ (quoted on Ch’oe, 1982, p.109).  
 
When opposing economic opening via Western-style trade treaties, wijeong-cheoksa 
thinkers invoked not just traditional Confucian values but also the norms of the 
Confucian-inspired Chinese world order. Under these norms, the Chinese emperor was 
expected to respect Korea’s autonomy in both domestic and foreign affairs in return for 
the Korean leader’s loyalty and submission (Chandra, 1988, pp.16-7; Cho, 2015, p.686; 
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Hwang, 1978, p.13; Kim, 1980). Scholars question how influential the norms of this 
Chinese world order were on actual state behaviour in East Asia (Larsen 2013), but the 
Korean state supported them more closely than other states (Kim, 1980, pp.2-3).  
 
In the late 19th century, the wijeong-cheoksa group strongly opposed Western-style 
trade treaties not just because they required economic opening but also because they 
threatened to erode this Sino-centric world order and its norms that reinforced Korea’s 
autonomy. Reformers argued the opposite; that Korea needed to escape its subordinate 
relationship to China by embracing Western-style treaties that embodied new norms of 
sovereign equality. But wijeong-cheoksa thinkers contrasted Western-style of 
international relations – with its immoral struggles for power and wealth – with the 
ethical norms of the ‘Chinese world order’ that had upheld Korea’s autonomy. For these 
thinkers, Western-style economic competition, war, and power politics to strengthen 
national wealth and power were all regarded as the activities of ‘beasts’, not civilised 
humans (Chang, 2003). Opponents of economic opening thus trumpeted the slogan: 
‘Revere China, Expel the Barbarians’ (quoted on Hwang, 1978, p. 17). 
 
Indeed, wijeong-cheoksa thinkers argued that the ultimate objective behind foreign 
powers’ demand for trade was the colonisation of Korea (Kim, 1989a, p.40; Chung, 
2008, pp.37-8). This argument drew on longstanding Korean fears of conquest, fears 
that had played a large role in generating Korea’s initial turn to an exclusion policy back 
in the 17th century in the wake of external threats at the time (Hwang, 1978, p.5; Kim, 
1980, pp.26-30). In the early 19th century, Koreans became increasingly focused on the 
threat of conspiracies between Korean Catholics and Europeans seeking to take over the 
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country (Kim, 1980, pp.34-7; Chung, 1995, pp.35-6). If economic opening encouraged 
the greater spread of Christianity, the wijeong-cheoksa group feared this risk would only 
grow. Korean fears of foreign invasion were only reinforced by their country’s armed 
conflicts with France in 1866 and the United States in 1871 as well as China’s Opium 
Wars and the French invasion of Vietnam (Kim, 1989a, p.21). In the face of these 
threats, wijeong-cheoksa thinkers argued that those supported economic opening were 
traitors. From their standpoint, only autarchy – reinforced by the norms of the Chinese 
world order – could protect both the nation’s independence and its socio-cultural 
traditions (Chung, 2008, pp.40-1; Kim, 1969). 
 
The wijeong-cheoksa group’s defence of the norms of this Confucian ‘Chinese world 
order’ rested on an overly romantic and idealistic depiction of past Chinese-Korean 
relations (McNamara, 1996, p.55). Its more important problem, however, was that 
China’s treatment of Korea after 1882 seemed to signal China’s complete abandonment 
of the historical norms. Not only had China begun to directly intervene in Korean 
domestic politics in unprecedented ways, but it had also pressured Korea to open its 
economy and sign Western-style trade treaties. In the context of the new Western threat, 
China had embraced Western-style international relations both in its dealings with the 
West and its new kind of informal imperialism in Korea. In other words, the norms of 
the Sino-centric world order that the wijeong-cheoksa group wanted to preserve had 
been abandoned by Chinese officialdom (McNamara, 1996, p.56; Larsen 2013).  
 
Despite the problematic nature of some of the arguments of the wijeong-cheoksa group, 
they were fascinating in the context of Western political economy scholarship at the 
 29
time. The best known critic of free trade in the West in the late 19th century was 
Friedrich List. Well known to IPE scholars today, List is usually described as an 
‘economic nationalist’. But he did not advocate the kind of rigid economic autarchy that 
the wijeong-cheoksa group backed. Instead, he simply favoured selective trade 
protectionism and other forms of targeted state intervention in the economy to promote 
developmental goals in the context of an open world economy. In other words, his 
views were closer to those of the gaehwa group than wijeong-cheoksa thought. 
 
There were some earlier defenders of economic autarchy in the West who usually 
receive less attention from IPE scholars today. One was Johann Fichte who outlined a 
case for autarchy in his work The Closed Commercial State published in 1800. Fichte, 
however, proposed a closed economy for a quite different reason than the wijeong-
cheoksa group: to enable a new kind of state economic planning that served citizens’ 
needs. Fichte’s proposal was also very different because he argued that economic 
autarchy should not prevent ideas and culture from continuing to flow across borders 
(Helleiner, 2002). 
 
In the 18th century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau also backed national economic self-
sufficiency as a tool for defending against foreign political influence and protecting his 
ideal model of an egalitarian agrarian economy (Tickner, 1980). This rationale came 
closer to the ideas of the wijeong-cheoksa group. But the Neo-Confucian values and 
social structures that wijeong-cheoksa thinkers sought to protect had little in common 
with Rousseau’s egalitarian vision. Also unique was the fact that the Korean thinkers 
tied their advocacy of autarchy to the defence of a vision of global politics based on the 
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(idealised) traditional Chinese world order that had no parallel in Western thought at the 
time. 
 
None of these European thinkers were mentioned by the Korean advocates of economic 
autarchy in the late 19th century. In the case of early wijeong-cheoksa thinkers such as 
Lee Hang-ro, this neglect simply reflected the fact that Korean knowledge of Western 
thought before the 1870s was extremely limited. In the case of later thinkers, it can also 
be explained by their hostility to all things Western. After all, at the core of wijeong-
cheoksa thought was the idea that Korean society and its civilisational values needed to 
be protected against foreign influence.  
 
The wijeong-cheoksa group thus highlighted very effectively the centrality of 
civilisational issues on both sides of the Korean political economy debate. While the 
gaehwa group appealed to Western civilisational standards in promoting economic 
opening, the wijeong-cheoksa group defended economic autarchy by invoking an 
alternative set of Sino-centric civilisational values. As Chung Chai-sik (1995, p.140) 
puts it, the arguments of wijeong-cheoksa thinkers such as Lee ultimately boiled down 
to the case that ‘the maintenance of cultural and social systems was more important than 
the attainment of power and wealth’.  
 
The wijeong-cheoksa group’s arguments were also important in highlighting how non-
Western countries were influenced during the 19th century by the diffusion of ideas from 
not just dominant Western states but also powerful non-Western states. IPE scholars 
have focused much more on the diffusion of ideas from West to non-West than that 
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within the non-West. But for a country such as Korea, Chinese norms and values had 
long been much more influential than Western ones. The diffusion of these norms and 
values left important legacies in the Korean political economy debates at the time of the 
economic opening.  
 
The Korean case also shows how it was not just Western ideas that were ‘localised’ 
when they were imported into non-Western context. Chinese civilisational values were 
also modified and adapted in the Korean context in important ways. As noted earlier, 
Korean defenders of Neo-Confucianism saw themselves as upholding a more orthodox 
version of Confucian value than that which existed in China at the time (see also 
Hwang, 1978, p.12). While China became more open to the world economy in the mid-
19th century, wijeong-cheoksa thinkers also defended a more rigid kind of economic 
autarchy, and they strongly critiqued the Chinese leadership for engaging with the West 
(Kim, 1980, p.29). Even more striking was the fact that these thinkers idealised a vision 
of a Chinese world order that Chinese policymakers and thinkers themselves were 
increasingly abandoning at the time. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper’s analysis of Korean debates in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
contributes to three bodies of IPE scholarship. The first is recent IPE scholarship 
exploring how civilisational values have shaped historical understandings of 
international economic relations. The Korean case provides an important reminder that 
civilisational values informed political economy thinking in this period not just in the 
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West but also in non-Western contexts. As we have shown, the debate between the 
wijeong-cheoksa and the gaehwa groups was, at its core, a clash of civilisational values. 
These competing values generated two distinctive ways of thinking about Korea’s 
foreign economic policy, and, more generally, about political economy itself.  
 
In highlighting the relationship between civilisational values and political economy 
outside the West, our analysis follows in the footsteps of Rojas’s (1995, 2002) 
important study of 19th century Colombian debates about free trade. At the same time, 
the Korean case reveals two dynamics that were quite distinct from those identified by 
Rojas in the Colombian case. First, Western civilisational values were ‘localised’ in 
quite a different way to support the developmental goals of boosting national wealth and 
power. Second, protagonists in the Korean debates drew upon and localised not just 
Western civilisational values but also Chinese ones. These contrasts between the 
Korean and Colombian cases highlight the need to recognise how civilisational values 
informed political economy debates outside the West in very context-specific ways.  
 
Our analysis also contributes to IPE literature examining the international diffusion of 
ideas. Early literature on this topic focused on the various ways that ideas spread from 
dominant Western states to less powerful countries (e.g. Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 
2006). More recent studies, however, have devoted greater attention to intellectual 
agency of actors in ‘receiving’ countries in translating and ‘localising’ global scripts 
(Acharya 2004, 2009; Ban 2016). The Korean case provides further evidence of the 
importance of this agency and of ‘localisation’ dynamics, and in a context that has not 
received attention in this literature. In addition, the case encourages IPE scholars to look 
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beyond the diffusion and localisation of dominant Western ideas to explore how non-
Western ideas also spread internationally and are adapted in local contexts.  
 
The latter point has important relevance for a third body of IPE scholarship: that 
seeking to build a more ‘inter-civilisational’ approach to IPE today. In an age where 
non-Western states such as China are rising in power in the global economy, the ideas 
and values of these states are likely to acquire growing influence beyond their borders. 
Part of the process of building this new approach to IPE must involve the greater 
scholarly attention to the diffusion and localisation abroad of those ideas and values. In 
this context, the Korean history of the late 19th and early 20th centuries serves an 
interesting precedent for the kinds of competing Western and non-Western ideational 
influences that may be experienced by many less powerful countries in the coming 
years. 
 
This Korean intellectual history can also contribute to the construction of a more ‘inter-
civilisational’ IPE in a more direct way: by calling IPE scholars’ attention to the 
important ideas and intellectual agency of some important non-Western thinkers. 
Contemporary IPE scholarship often makes reference to the significance of political 
economy debates from the 19th and early 20th centuries, but the focus is almost entirely 
on Western thinkers, such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Friedrich List, Karl Marx 
and the various European theorists of imperialism of the early 20th century. Recent 
scholarship has begun the important task of highlighting the biases and silences in this 
traditional canon of Western political economy (e.g. Watson, 2017). But the 
construction of a more ‘inter-civilisational’ IPE should involve more than just de-
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canonising the canon. It also needs to involve greater efforts to shed light and draw 
upon non-Western intellectual history (Cox, 2000, 2009; Helleiner, 2015; Helleiner and 
Rosales, 2017). Exploring the fascinating and unique nature of Korean thinking about 
political economy issues at the time of its economic opening is one place to start. 
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